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Much of Amartya Sen’s work has been directly policy-related, but his 
methodology of policy analysis has not been explained in detail. Action-related 
social science involves value-imbued procedures that guide the numerous 
unavoidable choices. This theme was explored earlier by authors close to Sen’s 
milieu such as Streeten and Stretton, and by forerunners including Dewey and 
Myrdal. Assisted by Jean Drèze, Sen has evolved a form of policy analysis 
guided by humanist values rather than those of mainstream economics. 
Features of the methodology include: 1) A wider range of values employed in 
valuation, with central attention to: how do and can people live? 2) Conceptual 
investigation of the wider range of values. 3) Use of the wider range of values 
to guide choice of topics and boundaries of analysis. 4) Hence a focus on 
human realities, not on an arbitrary slice of reality selected according to 
commercial significance and convenience for measurement. 5) Use of the 
wider range of values to guide other decisions in analysis; thus a focus on the 
socio-economic significance of results. 6) A matching focus on a wide range of 
potential policy means. The paper characterizes Sen’s policy analysis 
methodology, its roots in earlier work, and its relations to the UNDP Human 
Development approach and kindred approaches. 
Keywords 
policy analysis, human development, entitlements approach, capability 
approach 
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FROM ‘HUME’S LAW’ TO PROBLEM- AND POLICY-
ANALYSIS FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT1 
Sen after Dewey, Myrdal, Streeten, Stretton and Haq 
1 THE MISSING LECTURES IN SEN’S ON ETHICS AND 
ECONOMICS  
Amartya Sen’s lectures On Ethics and Economics (1987) considered two main 
themes. Firstly, since people use ethical ideas in orienting their behaviour, 
explanatory economics must understand those ideas and their roles; they are 
part of human and societal reality. Secondly, people argue about values, and we 
can identify and assess their reasons for the values. At the intersection of these 
two concerns, we can analyse and assess how people use values in argument. 
Ignorance of and segregation from ethics as a subject profoundly damages 
economics. Together these themes open up a great range of topics. 
While On Ethics and Economics worked at the levels of generalized 
explanatory theory and argumentation about values (identification, evaluation, 
choice), much of Sen’s work has been policy-related, and not only at the level 
of arguing about criteria such as efficiency or rights but concerned too with 
policy design and principles of policymaking. Yet neither Sen nor recent 
commentaries on his work (such as the special issue of Review of Political 
Economy, Vol. 15, #3, July 2003), give equal methodological attention to policy-
oriented analysis. Putnam and Walsh do stress that we need value-imbued 
central concepts such as ‘capability’. Walsh’s (2003) monograph length ‘Sen 
after Putnam’ focuses on how Putnam has defended Sen’s engagement in 
ethics by showing how every key term in his capability approach is ‘an 
entangled term’, and that such terms and rigorous defence of such a 
methodology are needed in order ‘to build a development theory [tapestry] 
black with the dire facts of the poor world, white with economic analysis, and 
red with a humane moral appraisal of the fragility of human attainments’ 
(Walsh, 2003, p. 389). (For related formulations see Putnam, 2002, pp. 62-3; 
Putnam, 2003a, p. 397.)  
Direction by values is likely to be stronger in policy-related work, given its 
felt urgency and practical role, and the evident social and human significance 
of the choices. In their diverse ways, both Frank Fischer (1980) and Martin 
Rein and Donald Schön (1994) show aspects of this. More widely though, 
most social science involves not only value-imbued central concepts but value-
imbued procedures that guide the numerous unavoidable choices. This has 
been explored and illustrated by pragmatist writers such as Michael Scriven 
(1972), and authors close to Sen’s milieu including Gunnar Myrdal, Hugh 
Stretton, and Paul Streeten. Introducing Myrdal’s essays Value in Social Theory, 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank seminar audiences in Birmingham, Groningen and Rotterdam, 
and Bridget O’Laughlin, Steven Pressman, Ingrid Robeyns, Irene van Staveren, Paul 
Streeten and three anonymous referees for helpful reactions and advice. 
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Streeten (1958, p. xiii) argued: ‘Values are not something to be discarded, nor 
even something to be made explicit in order to be separated from empirical 
matter, but are ever-present and permeate empirical analysis through and 
through.’  
Sen remains more reticent than this in declared methodology, whether due 
to his affiliations, strategy, or style. Perhaps, after Myrdal’s troubled example, 
he deemed it strategically unwise to continually stress guidance of analysis by 
values. He has always aimed to influence mainstream economics from within, 
with no offence or confrontation. His intellectual self-identification is with the 
economics mainstream from Adam Smith and J.S. Mill to Kenneth Arrow and 
Robert Solow. He regularly invokes the ‘fundamental theorems of 
[neoclassical] welfare economics’ and has put much of his energy into refining 
the individualistic framework of social choice theory. His theoretical focus has 
been more on Arrow (1951) than on Streeten (1954, 1958).  
Yet, from his diagnosis of the limitations of Arrow’s social choice theory, 
and its need for more types of information and more explicit value judgements, 
combined with his confrontation of famine, Sen has evolved a powerful form 
of policy analysis guided by humanist values rather than those of mainstream 
economics. It has influenced the Human Development Approach of the 
United Nations Development Programme et al. It is best seen in his book with 
Jean Drèze, Hunger and Public Action (1989), and seen also in Poverty and Famines 
(1981), Development as Freedom (1999), and India: Development and Participation 
(2002). The methodology moves away from and far beyond the economic cost-
benefit analysis where he began (Sen, 1960; Dasgupta, Marglin & Sen, 1972). 
Features of the methodology include, as outlined in Figure 1: 
 A wider range of values is employed in valuation, far beyond willingness-
(backed by ability)-to-pay 
 Central attention goes to how do, and can, people live?  
 Conceptual and theoretical investigation is undertaken into this wider 
range of values 
 The wider range of values guides our choice of topics—famine, family, 
education, health, political freedom—and of boundaries of analysis. It 
brings a focus on core human realities, not on slices of experience selected 
according to commercial significance and/or convenience for 
measurement 
 The wider range of values also guides other decisions in analysis; giving 
for example a focus on the socio-economic significance of results not 
merely their statistical significance 
 Attention goes to a wide range of potential policy means, thanks to wide-
ranging problem analysis, and because most of the wider range of value-
carriers have major instrumental significance too: nutrition, family, 
education, health, political freedom. 
It has become a form of policy analysis consistently guided by human 
development values rather than just the values of the market, namely who will 
pay for what. The paper’s Figures structure this family of themes.  
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FIGURE 1 
 Amartya Sen’s human development oriented policy analysis methodology  
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Where and how we act depends on where and how we look. Policy 
analysis as generally construed thus includes problem definition and problem 
analysis; we can use the term ‘problem- and policy-analysis’ to avoid any 
misunderstanding that ‘policy analysis’ refers only to design and selection of 
policy instruments and packages. Sen’s contribution lies especially but not 
exclusively in problem-definition and -analysis. In fact, his work and the 
human development approach claim not more than to give a partial intellectual 
framework for advice on what should be done next in any given real situation..  
Sen has not articulated the methodology at length, nor is he its only 
exponent or practitioner. The paper diagnoses the approach seen especially in 
his joint work with Drèze and more generally characterizes his methodology in 
problem- and policy-analysis, and relates it to compatible work. Section 2 
identifies key issues raised by earlier authors like Dewey and Myrdal. Many of 
these issues are equally relevant to value-conscious pure explanatory analysis: 
boundaries of analysis, choice of concepts, burdens of proof, judgements of 
socio-economic significance. Section 3 considers how Sen responds to such 
issues in his form of value-oriented reality-driven economics, and shows how it 
is value-guided as well as value-conscious. It discusses both the capability 
approach and entitlement approach, and their integration. Section 4 comments 
on their further integration with themes of human security and human rights in 
the human development approach, shows how other work on methodology 
goes deeper in some respects, and identifies directions of follow-up. 
2 VALUE-CONSCIOUS SOCIAL SCIENCE  
2.1 From ontology and epistemology to methodology 
Through the 1960s to 1980s the leading economics textbook in Britain and 
perhaps Canada, also used in innumerable other courses worldwide, was 
Richard G. Lipsey’s An Introduction to Positive Economics. It continues as one of 
the leading textbooks, notwithstanding that a large part of the focus of 
economics, and of the book, is normative: the evaluation of situations, 
outcomes and policy problems and options. Conceived in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the book wished to distance itself from the normative and yet to engage in 
policy analysis. The values it used in evaluation were, in the fashion of the 
contemporary welfare economics and orthodox treatment of economic policy, 
largely hidden within its methodology or taken as self-evident and consensual 
and thus as not really values. ‘Lipsey’, as it was routinely called, was in this 
respect extreme only in its title and its explicit dedication to a positivist ideal; 
‘Samuelson’ and most mainstream competitors were no different. 
The mainstream economics methodological ideal of the period had been 
most prominently enunciated by Lionel Robbins in the 1930s and Milton 
Friedman in the 1950s: that as far as economics is concerned, values are 
matters of arbitrary, exogenous decision. Over value disagreements we can do 
nothing, except fight, declared Friedman (1953); ‘thy blood or mine’ orated 
Robbins (1932, p. 135). The choices are to be left to consumers, businessmen 
and authorised (and strictly constrained) political leaders. Values of consumer-
sovereignty, capitalist-sovereignty and national self-concern were presumed, 
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subject only to special exception; consumers alone decide what is best for 
themselves, the owners of capital alone retain the net surplus of an enterprise, 
and governments value only the interests of their country’s residents. 
Behind Robbins and Friedman lay a type of philosophical positivism, 
traceable back from the interwar Vienna Circle to David Hume in the 
eighteenth century. It is encapsulated in the so-called ‘Hume’s Law’: we cannot 
derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. The ‘Law’, or conjecture, or stipulation, is sometimes 
misunderstood to mean something further: that values are matters beyond 
knowledge, matters of taste, about which we can only fight or agree to differ – 
‘Hume’s Second Law’ in the minds of many economists (Roy, 1992). You like 
coffee, and I like tea. A less sweeping sister-formulation is the following: 
thought is or can be fully partitioned into statements of fact and statements of 
value. Within statements of ‘value’ we can perhaps distinguish evaluative 
(‘good/bad’) and prescriptive (‘ought’) statements. 
Hume’s Law can best be interpreted as a methodological warning about 
required procedure in inquiry: look for the value assumptions behind ‘ought’ 
statements. The asserted ‘Hume’s Second Law’ is epistemological, about what 
can or cannot be known. The proposition about full fact-value partitioning is a 
questionable ontological claim, that becomes a description of thought only by 
terminological fiat and that does no justice to many realms of thought. We 
could accept both an ontology of partitioned facts and values and a 
methodology of seeking value assumptions while rejecting the epistemological 
claim that values are matters of taste. The ontological fiat has often been 
misread as a proscription of value discourse. It does not proscribe reasoned 
value discourse but implies that this would have a particular form, namely 
occurring on the two sides of a fact/value divide. Walsh (2003, pp. 328, 336) 
cites Bernard Williams as a recent example of a dichotomist who engaged in 
rigorous value discourse – as did Hume himself. Hume believed in following 
people’s preferences on private matters, and for public matters expected to 
achieve a consensus of the educated. 
Even more important, we may accept or adopt the proposition on 
methodology even if we reject the proposed fact/value dichotomy. ‘I believe 
that boundary questions [such as between fact and value] are sometimes taken 
to be more important than they are. … imprecision of boundaries can still 
leave vast regions without ambiguity’ advises Sen (1980, p. 353). Value-laden 
does not mean fact-empty. The methodological injunction—to look always for 
the value inputs that underlie prescriptions, or, by extension, evaluations—is 
not tied to one ontology, and leads in the opposite direction from the 
attempted epistemological proscription: it encourages examination of and 
engagement with values. An injunction to distinguish and investigate values is 
methodologically invaluable even if—perhaps precisely because—there are 
areas of intricate fact-value entanglement. It drives us to attend to things that 
we might prefer to, or be habituated or pressurised to, ignore and conceal. (See 
Weston, 1994, for a similar position.) Rather than ‘Hume’s Second Law’ we 
have then what could be called ‘The Myrdal-Streeten-Stretton-Scriven 
Programme’. Michael Scriven, for example, a pragmatist philosopher and 
evaluator, has built value-identification and value-examination in as part of 
methodologies of argument analysis and evaluation (Scriven, 1976, 1991). 
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Scriven’s philosophical pragmatism, his recognition and indeed stress on 
important areas of fact-value entanglement (Scriven, 1972), leads him not to 
shun value investigation but to underline its importance.   
Early in his career, Sen engaged with Hume’s Law, checking out the 
philosophical mandate for an economist interested in normative analysis. His 
1966 paper both paid its respects to the methodological orthodoxy and 
established a space to pursue his intellectual interests; he has not written in this 
area since the early 1970s. Abstract discussion cannot in itself tell us how to 
work with values, only that we can and must. It has an essential role in giving 
this possibility theorem, but is insufficient. Let us see some relevant aspects of 
using values that were identified by earlier authors—Myrdal, Streeten and 
Stretton—who are close in substantive focus to Sen, and by a methodological 
forerunner, Dewey. They cover aspects of methodology that Sen has not 
expounded in equal depth. Sen though has formulated and exemplified an 
elaborate value-guided approach in practical policy analysis and evaluation that 
has been more widely adopted by others. We turn to that subsequently, in 
Section 3.  
2.2 Value-laden choices in social science inquiry and policy 
analysis 
The pragmatist John Dewey (1859-1952) remains a major influence in 
institutionalist economics, education, and some strands in research 
methodology, political theory, public administration and policy analysis, not 
only in America. Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987), Swedish economist, sociologist 
and administrator, was exposed to Dewey’s school of thought, especially in the 
years that he researched An American Dilemma (1944), but came to his own 
formulations. The Austrian-British economist Paul Streeten (1917-) connected 
many worlds, from the Vienna Circle and its critics through to the Human 
Development Reports of the 1990s, via work as Myrdal’s main associate on 
Asian Drama (1968) and Mahbub ul Haq’s chief lieutenant in the basic needs 
work of the late 1970s. He translated the German edition of Myrdal’s The 
Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory and introduced Myrdal’s 
collected papers on Value in Social Theory for an English language audience 
(Myrdal, 1958; Streeten, 1958). His own methodological contribution built 
from the ‘Note on Facts and Valuations’ in An American Dilemma. The 
Australian Hugh Stretton (1923-), a student of Streeten, extended Myrdal and 
Streeten’s methodological insights into a general theory of value-guided social 
science (Stretton, 1969) which he has applied in a reconstruction of economics 
(e.g., Stretton, 1999, 2000).1 
For Dewey, our intellectual relationship to reality is like that of a 
mapmaker to the earth (Shields, 2005, based on Boisvert, 1998; Dewey, 1910). 
Every map is selective, and every systematic map employs principles of 
selection that reflect intended users’ interests (e.g., navigation concerns or 
political concerns). Maps are known to be imperfect and open to 
improvement, but good maps are both disciplined by data and serve user 
interests. Myrdal, Streeten, Stretton, Charles Wilber and various institutionalist 
economists elaborated on this conception, with reference to social science and 
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to concerns to determine or influence public action. Several interrelated 
themes, represented in Figure 2, permeate their work. 
FIGURE 2 
Some institutionalist economics themes : values and the allocation of 
attention 
GENERAL CONCERNS  IMPLICATIONS 
 
BACKGROUND PHILOSOPHY 
– often pragmatist 
HUMAN AND SOCIAL 
VALUES 
– conceptual and 
theoretical attention 
 
Values affect concept 
formation 
    
EPISTEMIC VALUES 
– e.g., concerning roles of 
quantification, deduction, 
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– e.g., realism above elegance 
and simplicity 
ROLES OF VALUES IN 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
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choices in analysis, as 
seen in this column 
    
 ORGANIZATION OF INQUIRY 
– Communities of inquiry 
– E.g. expert epistemic 
communities; democratic/ 
participatory public reason 
COMPLEXITY AND 
INTERCONNECTION 
– important matters cross 
disciplinary boundaries 
 
A wide agenda arises for 
policy analysis and 
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Values affect choice of 




A first set of themes concerns the roles of values in analysis. Values affect 
concept-formation: ‘a rule of judgement is required to determine what particular 
objects or experiences should be lumped together under any given concept’ 
(Streeten, 1954, p. 362; see also Connolly, 1993). Concept-formation remains 
affected by reality too, as Putnam’s (2003b) principle of semantic externalism 
reminds us; concept-formation is a judgement process, not arbitrary. 
Values are inevitably implied in various aspects of explanation and 
interpretation, for example in allocation of the burden of proof. In statistical 
hypothesis testing we should compare the dangers of Type I and Type II errors 
with reference also to their socio-economic significance. For interpreting a data 
set we should look at the socio-economic significance of slope coefficients, not 
merely at the statistical significance of a relationship (McCloskey & Ziliak, 
1996). Not all choices however in economic or policy discourse are value-
matters in the sense of each reflecting an arguable world-view; some are errors, 
based for example on a failure to grasp the difference between socio-economic 
and statistical significance (ibid.).  
Values, implicit or explicit, necessarily affect choice of focus, including 
boundaries of analysis in explanation and situation definition in policy analysis. 
Values are involved in the allocation of attention. Sen (1980, p. 354) makes the 
point for description: ‘description can be characterized as choosing from the 
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set of possibly true statements a subset on grounds of their relevance’. The 
scope of coverage in explanation is potentially unlimited, since one thing 
affects another which affects another, in everwidening circles; almost 
everything has many causes and many effects. In practice none of us can 
uncover ‘more than a very few of the conditions and processes which together 
produce the effects which interest [us]’ (Stretton, 2000, p. 1065). Different 
people focus on different effects as well as different causes, in light of their 
‘different questions [that] spring from different values, social judgements and 
policy concerns’ (Stretton, 2000, p. 1065). ‘Which of the necessary conditions 
for particular effects should be brought into focus? Which of the chains of 
cause and effect that converge from the past should be searched for 
opportunities for collective choice…’ (Stretton, 2000, p. 1068). Stretton’s 
books, including those on urban planning and on environment, illustrate this 
powerfully. His 2000 World Development paper argues that ‘the activities, 
causes and effects to which [neo-classical economic] theory directs little or no 
attention include these’ in practice: [1] household and voluntary sector 
production, [2] the motives behind much of that production, [3] the moral 
sentiments which are needed to moderate and civilize acquisitive self-interest, 
and [4] ‘The law, culture and custom which sustain and enforce people’s 
conceptions of their legitimate interests …’ (Stretton, 2000, p. 1070).  
A second major theme is that of interconnection. Important interactions cross 
disciplinary boundaries, especially for explaining longer-run and more fundamental changes. 
There are no economic problems, only (in general) complex problems, as 
Myrdal liked to say. His enormous Asian Drama study is constructed around six 
interacting sets of factors: production and income; conditions of production; 
levels of consumption; attitudes towards life and work; institutions; and public 
policy (Dykema, 1986; Angresano, 1997). What Myrdal struggled to 
communicate in the 1960s is now the orthodoxy in development studies, 
ensconced in frameworks such as ‘Human Development’ and ‘Sustainable 
Livelihoods Analysis’. Myrdal and Stretton argued that the interconnections are 
in fact significant for many short-run issues too but that we screen them out.  
A third set of themes concerns epistemic values. Some of the values that 
are involved in explanation are epistemic rather than ethical and social—for 
example there may be an insistence on the mathematical or quantified—but 
epistemic values can have ethical implications; for example, a value that is not 
(yet) measurable disappears from view if we insist on measurement. Important 
choices exist amongst epistemic values (see Wilber & Francis, 1986). 
Mainstream economics has had a clear set of epistemic values; it follows 
… four rules: 1. distinguish between economic and noneconomic factors, and 
leave the latter out of the analysis entirely or take them as exogenously given; 2. 
develop mathematical models starting from the assumption that individual agents 
maximize utility or profits subject to constraints, and derive their implications in 
a deductive manner; 3. analyze economies in which individuals interact with each 
other through market transactions and examine whether markets produce 
efficient outcomes and if they do not, how they can be made to …; 4. subject the 
models to empirical testing using available empirical data, usually with 
econometric methods (Dutt & Jameson, 2001, p. 4). 
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Desire to imitate the precision of physics has led to ignoring wider 
interconnections in social (in other words, socio-economic-environmental-
psychological-political-cultural) systems and to the appeal ‘ultimately to 
epistemologically vague “elegance” or “simplicity” as the prime arbiters of 
good work’ (Mirowski 1990, p. 254). ‘Elegant error is often preferred to messy 
truth. Theoretical tractability is often preferred to empirical relevance', rued 
Lipsey (2001, p. 169) recently. Priority is given to ‘neatness’ and broad 
generalizations. Convenience for modelling is regularly the decisive principle in 
theory building, explicitly or implicitly. ‘A simple and plausible theory of 
human nature is one that posits that the essential human characteristic is to 
compete with others’ asserts Dutt (2001, p. 151), as if we should focus on just 
one of people’s many potentials and treat it as universally potent. Rather than 
synthesise a complex, context-relative explanation for the phenomenon of high 
consumption which does not increase happiness, out of several possibilities 
that he identifies, he chooses the single explanatory factor we mentioned (the 
proclivity to compete), for ‘it is simple, plausible, fairly precise, quite general (in 
fact it can even be applied to animal societies) …’ (Dutt, 2001, p. 154).  
A final major set of themes concerns the organization of inquiry. Inquiry is 
organized in communities of inquiry (Kaplan, 1964), which maintain and apply their 
epistemic values. So-called ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992) have a 
substantial technical expertise, and are a special case of, or component of, a 
community of inquiry. Dewey held that communities of inquiry should be 
open, accountable and relevantly disciplined, in order to safeguard the quality 
of knowledge and for democratic reasons (Shields, 2003). However, epistemic 
communities are typically funded and supported in proportion to how well the 
implications of their approach match the concerns of powerful groups.  
Since social inquiry involves selections and choices which do and should 
reflect social values, and also inevitably reflect epistemic values, Dewey, Myrdal 
and Stretton held that, for public policy, the value choices and selections 
should be made with wide public scrutiny, and that ‘all those affected by the 
outcomes of inquiry should be able to participate in inquiry’ (Evans, 2005, pp. 
250-251). Sen shares this commitment to general public reason. 
2.3 Policy analysis: in-built values of GNP or of human 
development? 
Values play two sets of roles in policy analysis: explicit roles and implicit roles 
(Carley, 1980). Explicit attention to values can occur in stages of the 
specification and application of policy objectives. This explicit attention 
sometimes happens, sometimes not; when it happens this sometimes has great 
importance for what happens later, sometimes not. Myrdal, Streeten and 
Stretton noted the tacit roles of values, in framing and steering inquiry. These 
roles are always present and often have great importance for what happens 
later, but are typically undeclared and unrecognised. Here the values are built 
into the styles of thought and methods of analysis, determining the issues and 
factors that are considered. For example, cost-benefit analysis treats only 
monetizable aspects, treats people overwhelmingly as individuals in a market, 
weighs people’s wishes in proportion to their purchasing power and ignores 
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people without money. These are not choices openly made at a stage of setting 
policy objectives. They are instead built into the method, as part of a 
worldview that values monetized economic production. 
We need forms of policy analysis that have inbuilt values of human 
development, in contrast to policy analysis for economic output, which is 
biased to the purposes of the monied acting as individuals, or policy analysis 
for other elite purposes (Gasper, 2006). If we learn from the political success 
of methods like cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and logical framework analysis 
(LFA), we can identify some important ingredients: 
 Built-in values. Value discourse that is not embodied in frameworks and 
methods for policy analysis often has little enduring impact. 
 Built-in values of human development. There should be a responsive ability to 
focus on people and their problems, not a limiting pre-set frame such as 
the perfect markets model or the imperfect markets model (Fine, 2002). 
Specifically the framework should include a foundational commitment to 
all humans and space for a broader range of human priorities. 
 Priority to realism, and corresponding epistemic defences. We saw that some types 
of epistemic value drive out some types of ethical value. The space for 
attention to a broader range of human priorities and interconnections has 
to be defended by epistemic values that stress descriptive realism above 
elegance, and thus for example human importance above monetization. 
 Political and administrative workability. LFA, CBA and related methods have 
an established political credibility and logistical workability. They are 
systematic, partially explicit, have intuitive appeal, and provide limited fora 
for systematic public debate of choices. Human development concerns 
require similar formats. 
Myrdal, Streeten, and Stretton provided a wealth of insights, calling for 
humane attention and well-informed educated judgement; but none gave a 
vivid and easily adopted alternative. Streeten (1954, 1958) showed how the 
means-ends format, by which economics tried to pass value questions to 
another realm (e.g., by saying that economics looks after output and growth, 
and others can decide how to use these), was fundamentally limited. This did 
not prevent the Lipsey generation from adopting such a dichotomy as their 
approach to policy and economics; for what was offered in its place? Streeten 
had in fact arrived at a major part of the ‘human development’ formulation, 
but only used it as a passing example: 
If consumption were the only end, and if production and exchange were only 
means to its achievement, certain rules about the optimum conditions of 
production and exchange could be laid down. The formulation of these rules has 
been the aim of an important branch of traditional welfare economics. But the 
disturbing fact is that neither the conditions in which production is carried on, 
nor the relationships generated by exchange are purely instrumental. They are 
human conditions, and human relations, which are valued as much as, and in some 
cases more strongly than, the end of consumption. Nor of course is consumption 
simply a given end. Not only are there good and bad ways of earning money, but 
there are also good and bad ways of spending it. (Streeten, 1954, p. 365) 
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So we require not the ‘fundamental theorems of welfare economics’ but 
assessment of the full range of human functionings that generate and are 
generated by a system of production, exchange and consumption, a system of 
human living. Unfortunately another whole generation was required before a 
full-fledged human development perspective emerged. 
To try to explain this delay, I add three more required ingredients to the 
list.  
 A ‘vision’. Abstracted analysis of values often has relatively little bite. It is 
sometimes easier and more effective to change a vision, a mental 
framework, than to change the associated abstracted values, proposes the 
psychologist Edward de Bono (1985); one at least needs to attend to the 
vision and the values in tandem. 
 A vivid and ‘handy’ toolkit: striking, memorable concepts, structured as an 
interlinked system, which organise and direct our attention and analysis, 
and are not difficult to absorb, remember and use.  
 Methodological exemplars. The critique of mainstream economics is a task like 
painting the Golden Gate Bridge, neverending, given the forces of 
privilege, funding and ‘elegance’ that sustain it. The best criticism is 
instead a good working alternative: not only methodological advocacy of a 
humanist pragmatism but its persuasive practice. Exemplars are a vision’s 
best communication. Myrdal’s own work, though influential for a while, 
was ponderous and eventually partly forgotten. 
Figure 3 adds these desiderata to the institutionalist and pragmatist themes of 
Figure 2. 
FIGURE 3 
Informing human development methodology from the institutionalist legacy 
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We will see how Sen, in conjunction with Haq, Drèze and others, has 
made major advances in these three directions. His analyses of famine and 
hunger provided the compelling exemplars that convey a vision and approach. 
3 UNDERSTANDING SEN’S POLICY-ORIENTED WORK  
Sen feared that the Myrdal tradition was overly preoccupied with social values 
as prescriptions and that it presumed that the inevitable selections in social 
science and policy analysis were all coloured with prescriptive intent. He 
insisted that there are other valid types of selection principle (Sen, 1980). 
Myrdal (1969) and Stretton (1969) were well aware of this point; they only 
counselled clarity on selection principles. In addition, when we come to policy-
oriented work, prescriptive intent as a major selector is a given; Sen’s own such 
work illustrates much of what has been said above.   
We will consider both the capability approach, as more narrowly 
understood, and entitlements analysis, viewing them as a package.2 Together 
with some other elements they constitute a Human Development Approach. 
We start with capability, the lead organizing value or values; and then move to 
the system for thinking about causes and consequences of capabilities.  
3.1 Elements of Sen’s approach: Value-driven focus and 
scope  
A wider range of values is used in evaluation. We must look at life expectancy and life 
quality and their distribution, not only at average income and income 
distribution. This principle of breadth Sen and Haq drew already in the 1950s 
from, amongst others, Barbara Ward. Gradually, it led them beyond 
disciplinarity.  
The wider range of values is based on and motivates conceptual and theoretical 
investigation. Sen’s use of a wide range of values gains authority from his 
connection to and decades of theoretical groundwork in philosophical ethics.  
The wider range of values has a central focus: on persons’ life-reality, how they 
live and can live, what they can achieve with what they can acquire. This is the 
generative centre of the approach’s vision. ‘The focus on entitlements, which is 
concerned with the command over commodities, has to be seen as only 
instrumentally important, and the concentration has to be, ultimately, on basic 
human capabilities’ (Drèze & Sen, 1989, p. 13, emphasis added), namely: ‘the 
capability of people to undertake [basic] valuable and valued “doings and 
beings”‘ (ibid. p. 12).3 This includes attention to security of achievement, not 
merely to averages.  
Values guide the choice of topic. There is direct attention to central human 
problems, identified in terms of the lead values: hunger, family, education, 
health, peace, participation, differential mortality,…; leading to attempts to 
trace their causal roots. Problems are identified in relation to feasible 
alternatives, rather than in terms of a timeless disciplinary agenda. ‘Hunger 
is…intolerable in the modern world in a way it could not have been in the past. 
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… because widespread hunger is [now] so unnecessary and unwarranted…’ 
(Drèze & Sen, 1989, p. 3). Enormous inequalities are part of the cause, not 
only part of the moral problem: markets pull resources to the monied, away 
from the more vulnerable.  
Priority attention, notably to education, flows from causal theory as well as values. 
Education, including the education of girls and women, receives more 
attention than any other topic in Drèze and Sen’s book on policy priorities for 
India (2002). Education is identified as intrinsically important but also as 
instrumentally central, notably the education of mothers and potential mothers, 
and as potentially constitutively important for building consensual public 
purposes, for example through the effect of local schools that are shared by all 
social classes (2002, p. 181).  
The wider range of values influences detailed problem formulation in policy analysis, and 
generation of subsidiary topics for explanatory analysis. Attention at the level of each 
distinctive individual is impossible, but is still a guiding ideal: to see how 
persons (can) live, paying attention to the major sources of their 
distinctiveness. The problem of hunger must therefore be addressed on at least 
a class-basis, not in terms of aggregates or averages. The relevant classes are at 
a micro- not macro-scale: ‘the analysis must inter alia concentrate on 
occupation groups ... it is often important to take a more disaggregative view 
of the economy than one might get from standard class analyses’ (Drèze & 
Sen, 1989, p. 30) and look instead at ‘groups of individuals sharing similar 
(main) ingredients of entitlements: rural seasonal wage workers, pastoralists, 
sharecroppers, etc.’ (O’Laughlin & Pouw, 2004a, p. 6). The required next step 
is to consider also the positions of women and girls and any other especially 
marginal persons within these groups.   
The focus and scope in modelling and explanation are not predetermined: as in the 
work on famine and hunger, they are reality-derived not discipline-derived. The 
focus on matters of ultimate concern induces attention to a wider range of 
determinants, for example the numerous other determinants of nutrition than 
income or food availability: tastes, social constraints, differential bodily 
requirements, state of health (and thus in turn: water quality and quantity, 
sanitation), information and education,… (Drèze & Sen, 1989, p. 177 ff.). 
Concern with hunger leads us to much more than food and food entitlements. 
Concern with physical security leads us to identify the impacts of economic 
inequality and gender bias on violent crime (Drèze & Sen, 2002, pp. 269-270).   
Disciplinarity is exploded by the focus on persons not on abstracted general 
categories like income or food supply. Prolonged experience of the multi- and 
inter-disciplinary contemporary community of inquiry that addresses famine, 
hunger and nutrition—with membership from agriculture, anthropology, 
conflict studies, economics, epidemiology, food science, journalism, political 
science, physiology and nutrition, public administration, public health, medical 
and social statistics, and so on—seems to have influenced Sen’s assumptions, 
for example his views on the value of public reason. Unlike many economists, 
he no longer talks primarily in terms of ‘the economy’ or ‘economies’. 
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3.2 Entitlements analysis 
Entitlements analysis links the capability approach with policy. Its application 
to famine and hunger was Sen’s key initial exemplar. It involves, as we noted, 
socially disaggregated analysis (originally of absolute poverty, but extendable to 
other questions), with attention to groups of similarly placed people (such as 
occupational groups) in order to reveal their different forms and degrees of 
vulnerability, their effective command over goods, and its various channels and 
many determinants. It looks especially at people’s enforceable claims and 
rights, de facto; and conversely identifies their claims and rights that are non-
enforceable (Gasper, 1993). Hunger becomes understood as a social product, 
not solely a natural product. Blaikie’s (1985) The Political Economy of Soil Erosion 
is Poverty and Famines’ sibling; it shows how value extraction from the poor 
leads them to degrade nature in addition to their own bodies (see also 
Dasgupta, 1993). In both cases, traditional disciplinary and territorial 
boundaries in explanation are not presumed and are not confirmed. Hunger 
and resource degradation are seen to emerge as side-effects within world 
systems (Davis, 2001).  
Values affected concept-formation in entitlements analysis in one way that 
was perhaps unfortunate. Sen’s label ‘entitlements’ derives from a policy 
concern: a disagreement with the libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick, for 
whom duly derived property rights were uninfringeable. Nozick (1974) called 
this the entitlements theory of justice. Sen (1981) showed how such a system 
of Nozickian entitlements, derived through markets without (proximate) 
violence, deceit or illegality, could leave vulnerable groups to starve to death. 
For general explanatory purposes however, entitlements analysis must look at 
acquisition power (‘exchange entitlements’, including from ‘exchange with 
nature’), not legal entitlements. One may have no prior title to that which one 
acquires (by use of open access resources, or charity or theft), and may not be 
able to acquire that to which one is entitled (legally or morally). The 
‘entitlements’ label created many confusions (Gasper, 1993) and contributed to 
misreading Sen’s approach as not concerned with food availability, whereas 
(exchange) entitlements to food in his terminology are certainly influenced by 
availability. 
Entitlements analysis had significant limitations in its original form (Sen, 
1981), but Sen did not present or use that as more than a generative schema. It 
is enlightening for thinking about access to food, but less helpful for thinking 
about access to public goods, or use of goods, or values other than goods. 
Entitlements analysis has lost prominence as a separate approach but has been 
absorbed into the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), the Human 
Development and capability approaches, and rights-based approaches. There 
the same ideas can be pursued with less pitfall-ridden terminologies. SLA, for 
example, incorporates themes from entitlements analysis in its assets analysis 
which makes a useful breakdown of the ‘endowments’ category into five (or 
more) categories of capital—natural, social, human, physical, financial (and 
sometimes cultural and political)—and in its attention to diverse forms of 
claiming-capacity. It also deals with ‘capabilities’, as skills, agency and assets, 
not only Sen’s sense of attainable valued functionings (Bebbington, 1999). 
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3.3 Sen’s approach in policy design 
Further facets of Sen’s methodology in problem- and policy-analysis must be 
noted, and can be illustrated from his and Drèze’s work on famine, hunger and 
nutrition, and (the weakness of) social development in India.   
A focus on ends, rather than a presumption of use of particular means. ‘We see 
“social security” essentially as an objective pursued through public means 
rather than as a narrowly defined set of particular strategies, and it is important 
to take a broad view of the public means that are relevant to the attainment of 
this objective.” (Drèze & Sen, 1989, p. 16). Use of the language of means and 
ends here does not presume that means are not also ends and vice versa.  
Attention to a wide range of policy means. Wide-ranging causal analysis leads to 
wide-ranging ideas for policy. Since food entitlements can be created or 
threatened at many different points and in many different ways, their 
protection or provision can equally be promoted in many different ways: ‘state 
action for the elimination of hunger can take enormously divergent forms’ 
stress Drèze and Sen (1989, p. 18) – food production, food distribution, 
famine anticipation, regular income/employment creation, emergency 
temporary employment for wages in cash or kind; health care and epidemic 
control; general economic development measures. Later they add ‘price 
control, tax relief, crop insurance, the support of livestock prices, and many 
others’ (p. 85), such as ‘reforms of the legal framework within which economic 
relations take place’ (p. 24), including changes in endowments through land 
reform, and pension and social security rights.   
Both-and, not either-or. Policy analysis not only considers multiple means, but 
should expect to employ multiple methods to accommodate multiple needs: 
‘An adequate plurality’ (Drèze and Sen, 1989, p. 102) rather than an inadequate 
purism. This can imply increasing market orientation in areas where the state is 
overextended, simultaneous with increasing state action in other areas (2002, p. 
52). For example, state action to boost incomes in cases of inadequate command 
over food can be combined with market action to deliver food in response to 
the boosted incomes.   
The category of public action: ‘public action should not be confused with state 
action only’ (1989, p. 18). For Drèze and Sen it is instead action for public 
benefit, and this can be done by various agents: families, associations, 
NGOs/PVOs and businesses can all contribute. Public actions not via the 
state, and actions to influence the state, are vital: to induce State action, hold it 
accountable, and complement it. A governance system requires a variety of 
types of organization. The State is however the essential leader and coordinator 
on many fronts, such as social security or famine prevention (1989, p. 159); 
and can generate extraordinary human development gains at modest cost (p. 
251) in a wide variety of political settings—wartime Britain, Sri Lanka, China, 
Costa Rica, Chile, Jamaica, Cuba, Hong Kong, amongst others (1989: Part III).  
The category of public reason. Sen extols the importance of information and 
reasoned debate in the public arena: to share and test ideas, to establish mutual 
awareness and recognition, to build informed and sufficiently accepted 
statements of public purpose, to treat people with respect and thus constitute 
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and maintain a framework of cooperation, and to provide the sort of essential 
political pressure seen in open reporting of disasters such as famine.  
Attention to respecting, promoting and engaging persons’ agency. This is illustrated in 
an emphasis on women’s education and on the better sustained results for 
population policy using education and discussion rather than coercion. As a 
further example: universal coverage in basic social services can avoid the 
problems of trying to directly identify the most needy, and avoid stigmatization 
and ensure broad support; but employment provision and promotion can 
often fulfil the same three criteria while being more discriminating in use of 
scarce resources (Drèze & Sen, 1989, Ch.7).  
The roles of political commitment and public spiritedness in furthering human 
development. Complementing the picture of persons as thinking agents is an 
understanding of people as social actors with a potential for mutual 
commitment. Drèze and Sen highlighted the extraordinary human 
development achievements that are feasible, and in several cases achieved, 
through well-focused public action in low and middle-income countries 
without having to wait for generations of economic growth. This was itself a 
triumph of well-focused, persistently value-guided, social analysis. Hunger and 
Public Action concluded by pointing to a new analytical and practical agenda: to 
understand the determinants of the political commitment, cooperation and 
competition which generate the required public action (Drèze & Sen, 1989, 
Ch.13).   
Some of these themes were standard in parts of social policy analysis, 
others less so. Sen presented them with particular force and lucidity, thanks to 
a motivating, guiding and integrating value perspective. Figure 4’s larger shaded 
area indicates how his approach extends a general institutionalist perspective 
into a more explicit and evolved system of ideas and fulfils to significant degree 
the desiderata that we mentioned earlier. 
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FIGURE 4 
Specifics in Sen’s policy analysis approach (italics highlight key additions) 
GENERAL CONCERNS  IMPLICATIONS 
A BACKGROUND PHILOSOPHY 
on: 
– wide range of relevant information 
sources 
– partial orderings 
– ‘positional objectivity’ 
– reasoned freedoms, &c. 
HUMAN & SOCIAL VALUES 
– wide range, plus 
– Central focus on basic 
human capabilities: 
life quantity, life quality, etc., 






Values and their implications 
(rather than a timeless or 
methods-driven disciplinary 
agenda) guide choice of 
topic: 
education, hunger,… 
    
Values affect concept 
formation: 
– disaggregated view of 
entitlement/ /vulnerability 
groups 
    
Priority to respecting, 
promoting and engaging 
persons’ agency 
     
EPISTEMIC VALUES 
– e.g. concerning roles of 
quantification, deduction, 
formalization, statistics 
– e.g. realism v. elegance/simplicity 
ROLES OF VALUES IN 
POLICY ANALYSIS  
Focus on and guidance by 
ends, not a presumption of 
particular policy means 
 – Public action is more than 
state action 
– Many public means are 
relevant 
– ‘Both/and’ not ‘either/or’ 
    
Promotion of political 
commitment and public spirit 
for public action 
     
ORGANIZATION OF INQUIRY 
– Inter and transdisciplinary 
communities of inquiry 




Entitlements analysis; tracing 
the determinants of effective 
command over goods/things 
and in turn of effective access 
to valued freedoms 
 
Focus and boundaries of 
analysis are reality-based 
not discipline-based: 
focused on persons’ lives 
not on abstracted general 
categories like income or 
aggregate food supply 
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4 EXTENSIONS: CONSTRUCTION OF A HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH  
This final section considers how far Sen’s framework, with its commitment to 
priority human functionings and capabilities, can be strengthened and 
consolidated as an approach to policy analysis. We are interested in an 
intellectual position’s potential for growth, whether it is a progressive research 
program or a dead end. In assessing a position, we often face a choice between 
alternative formulations of the position: between weaker and stronger versions. 
Scriven (1976) advises that we attend to the stronger not the weaker. Criticisms 
of the weaker are more easily rebutted: ‘But no, my position is the stronger 
version’. Evaluation of the stronger version addresses the real potential of the 
position and matches the spirit of inquiry. I wish to do that with Sen’s 
framework. I have suggested elsewhere criticisms that I think are weighty (e.g. 
in Gasper, 2002a); but they do not concern its fruitfulness as a format for 
thinking about alternatives in public action for human development. Figure 5 
surveys the extended approach that is emerging through various partnerships 
and refinements. 
Important criticisms have been raised against the framework as a tool in 
policy analysis, which are summarised by O’Laughlin and Pouw (2004b, p.15): 
in maintaining the microeconomist’s focus on individual choice, approaches 
inspired by Sen’s work provide a very narrow vision of poverty as a process. 
They do not address underlying political and economic relations of [power,] 
inequality [and dependency] that constrain individual choice and link individual 
experience to macro political and economic processes. In other words, capability, 
human development and livelihoods approaches do not give us enough analytical 
handles for identifying the reasons why certain groups of people have more 
capabilities or assets or different activities (and, yes, income) than others do. 
Micro-level analysis should be linked to analyses of processes at meso and 
macro-levels and of power relations. Occupational groups are frequently in 
competitive class relationships with each other, with some dominating and 
exploiting others. Critics (e.g. Devereux, 2001) argue that the micro-focus has 
led attention away from essential issues.  
An approach cannot do everything required but should do something 
useful and not undermine what else is required. The long used language of 
class does not bring such widespread and fine-tuned attention to effective 
acquirement capacities and their determinants as do the languages of 
entitlements, rights and livelihoods. In any case, Sen’s framework does not 
preclude or dissuade but rather induces attention to meso- and macro-
determinants. Bebbington connects the ‘changing livelihood dynamics among 
the poor to the changing assets of other actors’ (1999, p. 2032), and also directs 
analysis to cases where poor people ‘are able to deploy and enhance their 
capabilities…to change the dominant rules and relationships governing the 
ways in which resources are controlled, distributed and transformed into 
income streams’ (p. 2039; see also Baumann & Sinha, 2001). With ‘suitable 
reorientation, the livelihoods approach can be turned into a valuable analytical 
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Extending Sen’s policy analysis approach into a mature human development 
approach (italicized points are additions relative to the earlier figures) 
GENERAL CONCERNS  
IMPLICATIONS FOR 




– wide range of relevant 
information sources 
– reasoned freedoms, &c. 
– conception of ‘human’ 
– conception of ‘public’ 
– conception of ‘well-being’ 
HUMAN & SOCIAL VALUES 
– wide range, plus 
– Capability approach (CA): 
focus on valued human 
capabilities: 
life quantity, life quality, etc., and 
their security 
 
Methods of multi-criteria 
evaluation 
Human security (HS)  
– a focus on levels and 
stability of basic priorities for 
all 




Approach, that encompasses 
CA, EA, RBA, HS 
 
Global public goods 
Need for institutionalization 
and political bases 
EPISTEMIC VALUES 
– realism above elegance 
– sufficiency above precision 
– principles of ‘both-and’  
plus ‘adequate plurality’  
apply here too 
– and further contributions from 
Wilber, Chambers, et al. 
ROLES OF VALUES  
IN POLICY ANALYSIS 
Focus on and guidance by ends, 
not a presumption of the use of 
particular policy means 
 
Methods for examination of 
the ‘ever-present and 
permeating values’ in policy 
analysis, not only explicit and 
exogenous values; 
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– a vital field of operation, 
vindication and struggle  
  ‘Joined-up thinking’ 
ORGANIZATION OF INQUIRY 
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Entitlements analysis (EA); 
tracing the determinants of 
effective command over 
goods/things and in turn of 
effective access to valued 
freedoms 
 
Focus and boundaries of 
analysis are reality-based not 
discipline-based: 
Extension of entitlements 
analysis in rights-based 
approaches (RBA) 
 
4.1 Core concepts  
One requirement is that an approach be recognised as such, which requires an 
adequate ’brand label’. Some people include entitlements analysis and more in 
the capability approach, but the main definitional statements of the capability 
approach restrict it to a system of valuation. It seems better to adopt the name 
‘Human Development Approach’ for the encompassing system of policy 
analysis, within which the capability approach is just part of the valuation 
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apparatus. As Sen stresses, there are many other relevant valuation principles 
besides capability. The Human Development Approach is an approach to 
explanation and to policy which uses this widened range of criteria, including 
the capability approach, in evaluation and to identify what is important to 
attend to in a policy framework. It incorporates also entitlements analysis, 
human security discourse and much human rights analysis as further 
components.  
Mahbub ul Haq, founder of the Human Development Approach (UNDP, 
1990; Haq, 1999), thus included in it elements besides the well-known 
extension of the range of objectives to be considered in development debate 
and planning. First, Haq advocated and exemplified a ‘joined-up thinking’ 
(Gasper & Truong, 2005) which was not misleadingly restricted by disciplinary 
and national boundaries. A more vivid, incisive author than Myrdal, he had the 
authority of experience as Minister of Finance in Pakistan and could theorize 
for example how heavy military spending undermined democracy and probity 
not only other budgets. Second, his approach implies ‘joined-up feeling’: the 
evaluative field of reference is all humans. These two features—crossboundary 
analysis and feeling—support each other. Global public goods become a 
central issue. Third, his human security discourse (UNDP, 1994) reinforces 
both elements and ensconces a priority to basic human needs within the 
otherwise infinite perspectives of the capability approach (Gasper, 2005). 
Impelled by a sense of urgency, he opened the road to integration with the 
previously separate yet sister discourse of human rights. His urgency led, 
fourth, to the Millennium Development Goals as a crude but operative human 
development program with a rights basis.  
The human development perspective generates attention to a wide range 
of types of determinant and correspondingly a wide range of types of public 
action. Income is certainly considered, and understood as a basis of power not 
a strong measure of welfare. It is true that Haq had a bolder open policy 
agenda than Sen, for example in terms of land reform. This reflects a different 
style not a different framework. Sen makes repeatedly, emphatically clear the 
central importance of structures of access and exclusion, as in his reflections 
on which types of people died in the Bengal famine of 1943 and communal 
violence of 1946-7, and on why he did not die from his mouth cancer while a 
student.  
A human development approach needs a conception of ‘human’. Here, 
well-being research constitutes a relevant and central ethics-economics 
interface (Gasper, 2007a). ‘Public’ is another core concept that a public policy 
analysis approach for human development must deepen. The neo-classical 
category of public good is far from sufficient. Education and health care are 
rivalrous and excludable services; yet they may be granted public priority as 
merit goods and because their ‘consumption’ has major positive externalities 
(Wuyts et al., 1992; Gasper, 2002b, 2007c).  
4.2 Methods for value-guided analysis  
Besides recognisable terms an approach requires recognisable, manageable 
methods. For the central task of digging out values and value-choices, some 
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types of discourse analysis are important. I have suggested a method of policy 
argumentation analysis which is accessible to average students and practitioners 
(Gasper 2002b, 2004). It combines ideas from Scriven’s (1976) approach to 
analysis of arguments and Stephen Toulmin’s (1958) format for describing 
argument structure and conceiving counter-arguments; with each converted 
into worktable layouts that guide the user. The method supports a style of 
policy analysis that looks critically both at macro-features and ‘details’, both 
structure and style, and helps build an independent stance, providing space for 
and eliciting counter-arguments, alternatives, and users’ own experience and 
values. Avoiding the pre-set framing of arguments, found in most economic 
policy analysis, CBA or LFA, it instead develops skills for examining the 
framing assumptions that others use, which can help in conscious choice of 
frames and assumptions when tackling a particular issue.   
One vital policy argumentation skill is to probe what is presumed as 
normal, as requiring disproof rather than proof. Joe Hanlon (2000) and others 
in the Jubilee 2000 debt relief campaign brought to the surface the assumption 
that, unlike for domestic personal debts, international debts have absolute 
priority over spending on health and education, even when the debts have 
been arranged with corrupt rulers and even when all concerned have endorsed 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (including rights to education and 
health care). Thomas Pogge’s (2002) work on disastrous legal presumptions in 
the current world economic system—disastrous for human development in 
poor countries—exposes and critiques the notions, so convenient to global 
corporations, that every de facto ruler of a country can make commitments that 
are absolutely binding on his successors: debts, resource concessions, treaties.   
A second vital skill area concerns understanding indicators. Indicators are 
vindicators, notes Apthorpe (1996). They are central to policy rhetoric, an art 
of purposeful, forceful selection: they exemplify the trope of synecdoche, 
taking the part for the whole (Hood, 2000). Haq knew their political and 
administrative potency, and ensured that the Human Development work 
invested here. Morse (2004) provides a useful introduction to indicators 
oriented to the human development agenda.  
The important values involved include epistemic values, not only social 
values. We noted in Section 2 some epistemic values within the Human 
Development approach: realism above elegance, and relevance and sufficiency 
above precision. Section 3 touched on how Sen has applied these principles. 
He writes about the range of relevant social values and warns that, given this 
wide range, for many choices pure general theory gives no answer. But he 
illustrates practical procedure too: how a set of imprecise criteria often are 
sufficient for us to make useful orderings; and how the principles of ‘both-and’ 
and ‘adequate plurality’ apply to styles of knowing, not only to policy 
instruments. Other authors offer bigger pictures of relevant epistemic values: 
notably Robert Chambers (1997, 2005), and Charles Wilber (1978, 1986) who 
proposed holism, pattern explanation, and ‘storytelling’.  
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4.3 From joined-up feeling to rights-based approaches and 
deliberative public reason 
To give substance and sustenance to Human Development Approach features 
such as ‘joined-up feeling’ they must become embodied in institutions, 
frameworks, and methods. Methods of financial and economic cost-benefit 
analysis have a wide coverage across people, but only for those who have 
money and in proportion to their affluence: they are ‘money-tarian’ not 
utilitarian. Haq had a serious concern for equity but, in the economics 
tradition, his Human Development Approach did not offer guarantees for 
individuals. The approach has subsequently moved in that direction by linking 
to the human rights tradition (UNDP, 2000).   
Rights-based policy analysis is an operationalisation of entitlements 
analysis (Fortman, 1999). Entitlements impact analysis cannot be precise for 
there are so many determinants and uncertainties. But we can focus on rights, 
the rules of entitlement. Transformative policy analysis pays attention to 
designing and redesigning legal and institutional frameworks, including work 
on national constitutions and bills of rights and via the spread of international 
law. A principle that all those affected by a decision should be able to influence 
it might only be operationalizable via allocation of certain rights. At the same 
time rights-based approaches highlight that empowerment, not merely 
legislation, is the path to entitlement (Watts, 1991).   
The capability approach aspires that public discourse openly consider and 
check what range of variables, procedures and weights to use in decision-
making. It can connect here to the established methodology of multi-criteria 
evaluation which promotes democratic deliberation by avoiding extensive 
monetization and too rapid aggregation (Gasper, 2006). This is applied sans titre 
in Alkire’s Valuing Freedoms. But formal democratic deliberation does not go far 
in many LDC contexts (nor, often, elsewhere), and therefore methods which 
contain more built-in human development commitment are needed. Multi-
criteria evaluation like other methods can be prone to elite domination, and 
should be complemented by constitutionally based guarantees for fulfilment of 
basic needs.  
Operationalizing the human development approach thus involves some 
issues of measurement but, more centrally, involves how to embed—perhaps 
in a rights framework—alternatives to money-tarianism and to the other 
entrenched assumptions in economic assessment (GNP, the potential 
compensation principle, and the sorts of presumption identified by Hanlon 
and Pogge); how to build public endorsement of such alternative frames; and 
how to institutionalize multi-criteria evaluation and kindred methods. Real 
operationalization of value alternatives in policy analysis means comprehensive 
incorporation into methodology. The rights-based approaches represent a 
partial move, which needs to be taken further in methods of policy analysis—
in concept formation, situation analysis, options analysis, appraisal and 
evaluation—especially in reframing issues, reallocation of onuses of proof, and 
(re)allocation of responsibilities.  
These are issues of politics, values and social theory not only of technique. 
Korten (1994) asked what is the Human Development Approach’s underlying 
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political and economic theory; and warned that in the absence of any conscious 
theory it slid back to liberal presumptions and became merely a human face of 
the Washington consensus. The evidence is that Human Development 
Approach has progressive potential, but Korten’s warning remains valid 
(Gasper, 2007b). Sen’s insights are deep and valuable but not sufficient as a full 
theoretical and methodological basis for a Human Development Approach. 
We need to draw from others, from Haq, Stretton, Blaikie, Chambers, Fischer, 
Hanlon, Pogge, Wilber and many more.  
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1 None of these authors figured in the Walsh-Putnam-Nussbaum discussion of Sen in 
Review of Political Economy (vol. 15, #3), except for one reference to Myrdal by Walsh. 
Putnam in his recent writings on Sen refers to Dewey but he examines only the 
inevitably entangled linguistic nature of the inputs to inquiry, not the content and 




2 Some people use the term ‘capability approach’ as incorporating entitlements 
analysis; but the formal presentations of the approach that are widely taken as 
authoritative include virtually nothing on entitlements analysis (Sen, 1993; Alkire, 2002 
& 2005; Robeyns, 2005). 
3 Thomas Pogge (2002) explains how in practice we would have to aim to equalize 
capability across persons as formulated in terms of basic capabilities that everyone has 
reason to value, not in terms of each person’s idiosyncratic objectives.  
